'on the one hand, private people were able to free themselves from the ideological fusion of their double role as bourgeois and homme; but this uncoupling of the intimate sphere from the basis of property functioning as capital--which seemed to make possible the actualization of its idea within a public sphere of emancipated private people--also brought about new relationships of dependence. the autonomy of private people now no longer grounded in the genuine control over private property would be realizable as an autonomy derived from public status guarantees of privacy only as long as the "human beings" (no longer in their capacity as bourgeois, as before, but) in their capacity as citoyens themselves attained control over these conditions of their private existence by means of a public sphere that operated in the political realm. under the given circumstances, this was not to be expected. but if citizens in their familial existence could not draw autonomy from their control over private property, and also could not do so from participation in the political public sphere, two things were long longer given. on the one hand, there was no longer institutional support for an individuation of the person on the model of the "protestant ethic"; nor, on the other hand, were there social conditions within sight that could replace the classical path of internalization via the educational route of a "political ethics" and in this fashion supply a new foundation for the process of individuation.'
'The deprivatized province of interiority was hollowed out by the mass media; a pseudo-public sphere of a no longer literary public was patched together to create a sort of superfamilial zone of familiarity.'